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EDITORIAL
‘Il faut se méfier des ingénieurs: ça commence par la machine à
coudre, ça finit par la bombe atomique’.1
The United Nations Centre for Trade Facilitation and Electronic
Business has been considering adding to its Recommendations, in
particular ‘Recommendation 37 – Signed Digital Evidence
Interoperability’.2 According to the United Nations Economic
Commission for Europe Report 2011 (ECE/INF/2011/1, New York and
Geneva, 2011), at page 80, the Recommendation appears to have
been issued:
‘Building upon the success of its Recommendation on Single
Windows for import and export clearance, in 2010, UN/CEFACT
issued three new, supporting recommendations: Recommendation
35 – Establishing a legal framework for international trade Single
Window; Recommendation 34 – Data Simplification and
Standardization for International Trade; and Recommendation 37 –
Signed Digital Evidence Interoperability.’
However, the web site of the United Nations Economic Commission
for Europe included a news item dated 18 July 2011, which indicated
that the Recommendation was far from being issued, and it was
decided at the 17th UN/CEFACT Plenary on 7-8 July 2011 to extend the
review period for Recommendation 37 to 12 September 2011.
Although the content of this Recommendation has altered from its
initial iterations, nevertheless the text has the potential to affect laws
across the globe. There are two significant issues in relation to this
Recommendation. The first is the legal status of Recommendations in
general: it is not clear what legal effect, if any, Recommendations
have. The second, and more serious, is that it does not appear that
any lawyer has been involved with the drafting, if indeed, it is even
necessary.
The summary reads as follows:
‘The Recommendation defines a set of functional rules that signed
digital evidence should follow, in terms of the organization and the
relationships between the signed content, signatories’ certificates
and signatures.’
This is a ‘recommendation’, yet uses the past tense of ‘shall’,
indicating the mandatory nature of content of the document. It
follows that it necessary to determine the legal effect, if any, of such
a recommendation.
The Foreword (page 3) reads as follows:
‘The Signed Digital Evidence Interoperability Recommendation
aims at increasing the level of interoperability of electronically
signed digital evidence in order to facilitate the development of
paperless international trade.
To achieve this goal, the Recommendation defines a set of
functional rules that signed digital evidence should follow, in
terms of the organization and the relationships between the
signed content, signatories’ certificates and signatures.
The Recommendation does not deal with the legal aspects of
electronic signatures, which are dealt with at the international
level by other documents such as those published by UNCITRAL.
Neither does it does deal with the semantics, usability or
interpretation of the signed content. This Recommendation does
not conflict with UNECE Recommendation 14 “Authentication of
trade documents by means other than signature”.
To facilitate the implementation of these rules, annex B gives
examples of technical implementations using some of the most
recent digital evidence standards. This annex may be updated in
the future to take into account other proposed technical
implementations.
Due to the urgent need for improved interoperability in digital
evidence verification, the Recommendation and its annexes are
delivered simultaneously to facilitate the rapid deployment of the
Recommendation.’
The authors have made a number of statements that require
explanation:
1. There is no evidence to suggest that there is a problem relating
to the use of digital documents in international trade.
2. The use of the past tense of ‘shall’ indicates the mandatory
nature of the document functional rules that signed digital
evidence should follow. The Recommendation appears to
require all documents in digital format to be ‘signed’ using
digital signatures, yet there is no discussion of how digital
documents used in international trade are presently dealt with
in practice, nor any attempt to indicate how such documents are
accepted into evidence in various legal systems in the event of
litigation between the parties.3
3. There is an assertion that there is an ‘urgent need for improved
interoperability in digital evidence verification’, yet there is no
discussion of what evidence there is, if any, to indicate that
there is such a need.4
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1 ‘It is necessary to be wary of the engineers: it
starts with the sewing machine, it finishes with
the atomic bomb’, Marcel Pagnol, Critique des
Critiques, (Nagel, 1949), page 38.
2 The most up-to-date version appears to be
‘United Nations Economic and Social Research
Council, Recommendation no. 37: Signed Digital
Evidence Interoperability Recommendation’
(Architecture, Engineering and Construction
Working Group – TBG6,
ECE/TRADE/C/CEFACT/2010/14 dated 27
September 2010).
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The Executive summary (p 4) reads as follows:
‘A digital document, unlike a paper document, has little evidence
value until it is reinforced by a mechanism, such as an electronic
signature, which guarantees its integrity and authenticity.
However, because of the multiplicity of electronic signature
standards, verification of signed digital evidence by a recipient
may be impossible. This has a direct impact on the ability of
businesses and administrations to securely exchange digital
documents between themselves and with their administrative and
financial counterparts.
To address this issue, a functional rather than a technical approach
to signed digital evidence has been taken in this Recommendation,
by focusing first on the “what” instead of on the “how”.
The verification of signed digital evidence must, at least, give the
verifier a clear view of:
The signatures’ parameters (date, place, type of commitment).
The integrity of the signed content.
The integrity and validity of the signatories’ certificates.
The trustworthiness of the certification service providers.
This Recommendation thus defines simple and generic
requirements for creating and verifying signed digital evidence to
improve its interoperability while keeping in mind that its adoption
will elicit requests for changes over time.’
The authors assert, with no reference to any relevant laws or
procedural rules (of either common law countries or civil law
countries) that a ‘digital document, unlike a paper document, has
little evidence value until it is reinforced by a mechanism, such as an
electronic signature, which guarantees its integrity and authenticity’.5
The weight to be attached to a digital document is a matter for the
relevant substantive laws on evidence or procedural rules (or both) of
individual nation states. A document that includes an electronic
signature (the authors probably mean a digital signature) may have
some probative value in relation to its integrity, but little weight will
be attached to the authenticity of the document unless there is a
presumption that an electronic signature (or a particular form of
electronic signature) is attached to the data, or sufficient evidence
(other than the electronic signature) has been adduced to the
satisfaction of the finder of fact to convince them that the data can be
considered to be authentic.6
The Recommendation provides, on page 5, a list of benefits. 1.1,
which reads:
‘This Recommendation provides business, administrative and
financial organizations with a set of simple and standard
requirements for exchanging secure documents, which can be
matched by a variety of standard technologies and products,
including open source projects.
Its objectives are to:
Improve efficiency and reliability of the verification of signed
digital evidence received from another party.
Increase interoperability of signed digital evidence, which, in
turn, will increase trust and confidence.
Provide a wide, yet coordinated, path to increase the rate of
adoption of paperless technologies.’
The frequent references to ‘certificates’ merely indicate that the
authors of the Recommendation intend that the only approach is to
provide for a highly specific type of technology, namely Public Key
Infrastructure (PKI), which is not a product, but a number of
protocols. This will benefit the providers of PKI products. It will not
deal with the legal issues relating to liability, significant as they are,7
and the objective that asserts that the Recommendation will increase
3 For more information on 45 legal systems across
the globe, see Stephen Mason, general editor,
Electronic Evidence, (2nd edn, LexisNexis
Butterworths, 2010), covering: Australia, Canada,
England & Wales, Hong Kong, India, Ireland, New
Zealand, Scotland, Singapore, South Africa and
the United States of America, and Stephen
Mason, general editor, International Electronic
Evidence, (British Institute of International and
Comparative Law, 2008), covering: Argentina,
Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech
Republic, Denmark, Egypt, Estonia, Finland,
France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Italy,
Japan, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta,
Mexico, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Romania,
Russia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden,
Switzerland, Thailand and Turkey; for a more
detailed treatment of the United States of
America, see George L. Paul, Foundations of
Digital Evidence (American Bar Association,
2008).
4 Assertions that are not based on facts have been
used to partially justify the eJustice project in the
EU where a notice from the Council dated 5 June
2008 (only available in French) (Conseil de
l’Union Européenne Note de Transmission;
Origine: Pour le Secrétaire général de la
Commission européenne, Monsieur Jordi Ayet
Puigarnau, Directeur; Date de réception: le 2 juin
2008; Destinataire: Monsieur Javier Solana,
Secrétaire général/Haut Représentant; Objet:
Document de travail des services de la
Commission – Annexe au projet de
Communication de la Commission présentant une
stratégie européenne en matière d’e-Justice –
Analyse d’impact Les délégations trouveront ci-
joint le document de la Commission (le 5 juin
2008) SEC(2008) 1947; 10285/08 ADD 1 LIMITE
JURI FO 45 JAI 305 JUSTCIV 119 COPE 118
CRIMORG 87) included the following text at 2.1.2:
‘Si le pourcentage de citoyens européens
(2%) ayant été impliqués dans une procédure
civile dans un État membre autre que le leur,
reste faible, ce chiffre rapporté à la population
totale de l’Union devient particulièrement
significatif. Ce sont ainsi 10 millions de
personnes qui ont été concernées par une
procédure civile transfrontalière,’
An approximate translation into English renders
the text as follows:
‘If the percentage of Europeans (2%) involved
in civil proceedings in a Member State other
than their own remains low, the figure
reported in the total population of the Union
becomes particularly significant. This means
there are 10 million people who were involved
in cross-border civil proceedings’
This text is routinely cited in EU documents,
stating as a fact that there are 10 million people
involved in cross-border civil proceedings.
The precise number is not known, but in the UK,
the Office of Fair Trading, in answering questions
relating to the ‘Call for Evidence and Views on
the European Commission’s Green Paper on
policy options for progress towards a European
Contract Law for consumers and businesses’ by
the Ministry of Justice, indicated that in 2009
there were 41 cross border cases in the UK out of
850,000 cases.
5 As an aside, it must be explained that a contract
is capable of being entered into by word of
mouth, and such a contract is also enforceable.
Billions of people across the world enter
contracts in this way every day. For a criticism of
PKI from a technical point of view, and what it
does not do, see an early paper by Chris Sundt,
‘PKI — Panacea or Silver Bullet?’, Information
Security Technical Report (2000) 5:4, 53-65.
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‘interoperability of signed digital evidence, which, in turn, will
increase trust and confidence’ provides an inaccurate and
misleading suggestion that the user can expect to place ‘trust and
confidence’ in a technical product that is far from perfect.
On page 5, paragraph 2, the authors put the Recommendation
into context, commenting, at 2.1 in respect of ‘scope’ (footnotes
omitted):
‘1. Since the early 1990s, numerous technical standards for
signed digital evidence have been designed, proposed and
adopted.
2. However, as a result, this multiplicity of standards with many
possible options and lack of guidance on how to apply digital
signatures to documents has led to a lack of interoperability of
signed digital evidence from a syntactic, semantic and
processing perspective.’
It is an open market. A vendor decides how to apply a standard
(which is why standards are not quite what they seem), for which
see an article by Paweł Krawczyk in the context of the Directive
1999/93/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13
December 1999 on a Community framework for electronic
signatures,8 and how the politicians used legislation to require the
use of digital signatures and how different vendors implemented
different standards in different ways: ‘When the EU qualified
electronic signature becomes an information services preventer’,
Digital Evidence and Electronic Signature Law Review, 7 (2010), 7 –
18.9 Little has changed since Chris Sundt wrote on this topic in
2000:10
‘These problems arise partly through ambiguities in the
associated standards and protocols, leading to incompatible
implementations, and partly through proprietary development of
additional functionality by suppliers to make their offerings more
attractive and usable. There are also inherent problems in the
way that some of the standards are defined. For example, the
X.509 V3 certificate format allows user-defined extensions to
carry user-specific information. These extensions can be marked
as critical, in which case verification of a certificate will only
succeed if the recipient system can understand the significance
of that extension.’
On page 7, paragraph 2.3.13, the authors have addressed the
nature of the audience that the Recommendation is directed at:
‘This document is intended primarily for organizations and
individuals who have the following concerns:
Exchanging signed digital evidence in an open environment.
Choosing a format for signed digital evidence, suitable for a
particular dematerialization project.
Monitoring information technology with respect to the fields of
digital signatures and probative archiving.
Ensuring the interoperability, reversibility and validity of signed
digital evidence.’
These Recommendations are laudable. However, it is necessary for
the authors to include a reference to the difficulties in relation to
the archiving of digital signatures, for which see: Stefanie Fischer-
Dieskau and Daniel Wilke, ‘Electronically signed documents: legal
requirements and measures for their long-term conservation’ Digital
Evidence and Electronic Signature Law Review, 3 (2006), 40 – 44.
Generally, the Recommendation is not about evidence. It does
not follow that by complying with it, that digital evidence be
admissible in legal proceedings. The language includes the use of
the words ‘probative value’. It does not follow that a digital
document signed with a digital signature has any probative value.
The Recommendation only considers one problem, which is,
what can be understood from a digital certificate. There is a great
deal of detail about what can be signed, the relationship between
the signature and the content, the role and placement of ‘co-
signers’ or ‘counter-signatures’, but no discussion of the nature of
trust in relation to the supporting technologies and organization,
nor whether any such support should be credible.
The central issue in relation to the electronic signature has not
been addressed: indeed, it is assumed that it does not need to be
addressed – that is, how the recipient can be assured that (a) the
purported signing party was responsible for affixing the signature
to the data, and (b) the purported signing party had the relevant
authority to cause the digital signature to be affixed to the data. The
perennially difficult question of the liability of the certifier is also
not dealt with, except to the extent that potential liability may
compel adherence to high standards.
Throughout the Recommendation, the authors have referred to
the ‘signatory’. There are two problems with their failure of logic.
First, there is no ‘signatory’. It is not possible to say that Alice
‘signed’ a document. It is only possible to say that one form of
digital data (the data comprising a digital signature) is associated
with another form of digital data (the data that makes up the
document). That is all. Second, it is necessary to prove that a
particular person (that is the person whose name is associated with
the data) caused the digital data that comprises a digital signature
to be affixed to the digital data comprising the document.
Thus the authors should indicate throughout the
Recommendation that they refer to the ‘purported signatory’, not
the ‘signatory’. The use of the word ‘signatory’ presupposes that
the person who is asserted to have ‘signed’ the document has done
so.
Digital signatures are generally marketed as a form of electronic
signature that enables the recipient to prove that a document or
communication actually came from the person whose digital
signature was used to ‘sign’ the data. This is not correct. The private
key of a digital signature (also known as an ‘advanced electronic
signature’ in the EU) is protected by a password. If a person uses a
6 The same comments apply to the contents of
paragraph 2.1.4 on page 5 of the
Recommendation. For the proposed tests to
demonstrate authenticity, see Electronic Evidence,
Chapter 4.
7 Lorna Brazell, Electronic Signatures and Identities
Law and Regulation, (2nd end, Sweet & Maxwell,
2008); Stephen Mason, Electronic Signatures in
Law, (2nd edn, Tottel, 2007) [the third edition,
published by Cambridge University Press, will be
available in January 2012], M. H. M Schellenkens,
Electronic Signatures Authentication Technology
from a Legal Perspective, (TMC Asser Press, 2004).
8 OJ L 13, 19.01.2000, p. 12.
9 For a list (over 11 pages) of standards relating to
digital signatures, see Electronic Signatures in
Law, Appendix 3.
10 Chris Sundt, ‘PKI — Panacea or Silver Bullet?’,
Information Security Technical Report (2000) 5:4,
53-65.
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digital signature, the most important point to be aware of is this:
the private key of a digital signature is only as good as the
password that protects it. This means that when the password is
inserted into a computer to provide access to the private key of a
digital signature, it proves either of the following:
The person who keyed in the password (or username and
password) knew the password (or username and password); or
The person with access to the computer (whether they were
sitting in front of the computer or whether they obtained control
of the computer remotely) did not need to know the password
because the computer was instructed to remember the password
(or perhaps they correctly guessed it, or they were capable of
overriding it in some way).11
This leads back to the notorious and notoriously failed concept of
‘non-repudiation’ that continues, erroneously, to be asserted by
technicians.12
Furthermore, R16 bullet point 2 (page 12), provides as follows: 
‘Proof of approval, indicating that the signatory has approved the
signed content’. 
The authors do not indicate whether the purported signatory is
legally bound by the signed document. In addition, it is to be noted
that signatures serve a number of functions, only one of which is to
approve the content of a document. It is a sweeping provision that
asserts the purported signature approves the content.13 The
function of a signature can only be determined by understanding
the full context of the signature, including evidence that is not part
of the digital process. The function that a signature serves is not a
question of evidence, but a question of law that cannot be resolved
by technical means.
As the foregoing illustrates, the actual recommendation (below), is
neither possible to achieve technologically, nor does it remotely
address the complex legal issues that arise from the assumptions
that the technology can adequately address any of the issues it
purports to address:
‘1. Recommendation No. 37: Signed Digital Evidence
Interoperability Recommendation
This Recommendation encourages any organization that wishes
to exchange signed digital evidence with others to maximize the
interoperability of such evidence by following a set of proposed
principles:
Signed digital evidence:
• MUST contain one and only one identifiable content 
• MUST be signed by one or more signatures 
• MUST contain all identities involved in an unambiguous way. 
Each signature contained in the evidence:
• MAY contain a date of signature and other properties
• MUST sign the entire content
• MAY be signed by one or many counter-signatures.’
At best, the Recommendation may be useful to standardize the
form of assertions made by digital signatures, so that different
systems of verification can recognize assertions made by different
systems of creation of signatures. But from this point to assert that
complying with the Recommendation makes a digital document of
legal value or more probative than it was before, even if combined
with existing standards on digital signatures, is unjustified.
The central question about this document has yet to be resolved:
why such a project was initiated. There is no evidence to
demonstrate that it is necessary. Marcel Pagnol was only partly
correct at the time he was writing, because without the politicians,
the engineers would not have developed nuclear fission, although it
might only have been a matter of time. In one respect he was far
more prescient: engineers are making sure that machines take over
life, and this is very dangerous for humans as a species.
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As a matter of record, the names of those involved in this
Recommendation are set out below (this information is not included in
the document dated 27 September 2010, but is include in the following
document: Recommendation No. 37 Digital Evidence Certification
Recommendation, (ECE/TRADE/TBG/CEFACT/2010/xx, DEC-R V1.1 –
Proposal – revision 2.0.2, 19 February 2010), which is marked ‘Working
document: do not copy or distribute without authorization’):
Editors: François Devoret ((UN/Cefact Security Project Editor) and
Julien Pasquier, both of whom work for Lex Persona, an organization
that sells digital signatures and PKI products; Andrea Caccia, who is a
member of AITI (Associazione Italiana dei Tesorieri d’Impresa) that
includes financial payment systems and Commissione Tecnica
Dematerializzazione Straight Through Processing (Member of
ETSI/ESI) and Michel Entat, who founded Conseil en Management des
Systèmes d’Information that deals with paperless tendering.
Contributors: Sujeet Bhatt (UN/Cefact Security Project Leader) and
Ajit Menon, NexTenders (India) Pvt Ltd, which apparently deals
exclusively with public eProcurement and eTendering using digital
signatures and PKI, using a patented Security Architecture; Paul
Burrows, who is Head of Information Systems of the RICS Building Cost
Information Service that sells an eTendering product; Andrew Hudson
of Kern CM Limited, an organization that provides an e-tendering
service; Bernard Longhi of BLC-Consultants (he seems to be the only
consultant) and Kevin Smith of Cloud Data Technologies Limited
((UN/Cefact TBG6 Chair).
Reviewers: Gordon Cragge of Sitpro, which ceased to exist on 31
August 2010 and Chris Hassler of DOD-DCMA (Defense Contract
Management Agency).
11 For cases where digital signatures have been
used by criminals to transfer funds from
company bank accounts, see Olga I.
Kudryavtseva, ‘The use of electronic digital
signatures in banking relationships in the
Russian Federation’, Digital Evidence and
Electronic Signature Law Review, 5 (2008), 51 –
57, and Olga I. Kudryavtseva, Case note:
Resolution of the Federal Arbitration Court of
Moscow Region of 5 November 2003 N -А
40/8531-03-, Digital Evidence and Electronic
Signature Law Review, 5 (2008), 149 – 151.
12 For a detailed discussion of why ‘non-
repudiation’ is irrelevant, see Electronic
Signatures in Law, 14.20 – 14.21.
13 For a detailed discussion of the functions a
signature is capable of serving, see Electronic
Signatures in Law, 1.20 – 1.26.
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